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ARTICLES 
QUO VADIS, POSADAS?1 
By William Van Alstyne2 
Whether a State may ban all advertising of an activity that it permits but 
could prohibit ... is an elegant question of constitutional law? 
Five years ago, Thomas Jeffries, the owner and publisher of The 
Charlottesville Observer, decided to add a new weekly feature in the Metro 
news section, in which local motorcycle dealers were identified by trade 
name, location, and business hours, listing new cycles and any special sales. 
Jeffries added the feature and captioned it "Motorcycle News," thinking it 
might eventually establish a certain cachet with some readers, if merely in 
the same manner of the five-day weather forecast feature that other readers 
had come regularly to look for in the paper. 
Jeffries also thought this feature might catch on especially well in 
Charlottesville. It was a college town, located in a beautiful part of Vir-
ginia, benefiting from a mild climate, and a fine, inviting road system with 
connecting links to Richmond, the nearby capital city, with additional sce-
nic roads wending eastward toward Colonial Williamsburg. Jeffries noted, 
too, that campus parking for cars at the University of Virginia was already 
quite crowded and increasingly expensive. The sprawl and congestion of 
asphalt lots seemed to have no end in sight, yet few students and towns-
people were willing to settle for getting around by bicycles or public trans-
1. "Dicit ei Simon Petrus Domine quo vadis?" (Vulgate) ("Simon Peter said unto him, Lord, 
whither goest thou?") (The Bible, King James Version, John 3:36.5.) Also fitting this essay, perhaps, 
is the enigmatic answer: "Respondit Jesus quo ego vado non potes me modo sequi sequeris autem 
postea" ("Jesus answered him, Whither I go, thou canst not follow me now; but thou shalt follow me 
afterwards.") 
2. William & Thomas Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. This article is derived from 
the Siebenthaler Lecture delivered at Salmon P. Chase College of Law in the Spring of 1997. I am 
most grateful for the hospitality extended by Dean David Short, Professor David Elder, and the faculty 
and students. 
3. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 359 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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portation. The proposed "Motorcycle News" feature might suggest an 
alternative. If not, still little would be lost, or so Jeffries thought. 
The weekly feature ran as Jeffries had planned. He proved to be quite 
right. Indeed there had been an interest in his innovative news feature as he 
was pleased to learn from an informal reader survey just this year, on the 
strength of which he decided to continue the feature indefinitely. Jeffries 
was also pleased that it seemed to have encouraged more students and oth-
ers to rely on motorcycles than on cars, reducing parking congestion in the 
campus area, contributing to easier traffic flow in the Charlottesville area, 
and lessening the need for more city asphalt parking lots; developments 
which, earlier, in Jeffries' view, had threatened the great charm of Char-
lottesville. 
An incidental benefit, which also pleased Jeffries, was that the 
several local motorcycle dealers realized they were benefiting from 
favorable reader response to the weekly Metro "Motorcycle News" feature 
of the Observer. Accordingly, they now much more regularly sought out the 
newspaper and tended to place more advertising with the Observer than they 
had previously been inclined to do. 
Of course, not everyone was quite as well pleased (no one ever is, it 
seems), including a number of car dealers for whom sales had been quite 
flat in the Charlottesville area, and some of whom were inclined to blame 
Jeffries, as well as the motorcycle dealers, for their plight. 
Consequently, through their trade association, the Virginia Car Dealers 
Association (" V.C.D.A." ), they sought help through the Virginia General 
Assembly where, in comparison with the very much smaller Virginia Mo-
torcycle Dealers Association (" V.M.D.A." ), they had always had much 
more influence than the motorcycle dealers possessed. They counted, too, 
on attracting strong support from several public interest groups, such as 
Mothers Against Motorcycle Drivers(" M.A.M.D." ), the highly influential 
Virginia Medical Association (" V.M.A." ), and Citizens for a Drug-Free 
America (" C.D.F.A." ), a citizens' group who associated motorcyclists 
with the drug culture. 
The Automobile Dealers' and their highly supportive public-interest 
allies' strong first preference was to have the Virginia General Assembly 
adopt a statute simply prohibiting motorcycles. Toward that end, their 
preferred strategy was to launch a general campaign well calculated to 
educate the public on the dangerousness of motorcycles, playing to the 
negative stereotypes of motorcyclists: of recklessness, drug culture, and the 
public burden of excessive medical costs borne by the public from cyclist 
injuries, injuries that would have been avoided with the greater shielding of 
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automobiles. In mounting this campaign, and in thinking it might well have 
its desired effect, they took their cue from an earlier era in which a trade 
association of American railroads had sought measures of a similar 
restrictive nature against motor freight carriers.4 Moreover, in moving in 
just this fashion, insofar as it would prove effective, they were much 
encouraged by their attorney's advice. 
Their attorney assured them that wer~ the General Assembly to outlaw 
motorcycles, to forbid any further retail motorcycle trade, as a public safety, 
health, and general welfare measure, they could be confident. that the 
measure would easily hold up against any mere Fourteenth Amendment 
"substantive due process" or "equal protection" constitutional complaint any 
motorcycle dealers might press in any state or federal court. There was 
likewise nothing in the state constitution that would stand in the way. 
The attorney's confidence seems to have been well warranted. The few 
pertinent clauses of the state constitution, such as they were, had been 
uniformly construed by the state supreme court merely to mimic what the 
federal courts had done in applying the restrictions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the states. And the futility of a challenge under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was all but guaranteed in view 
of the Supreme Court's own long-standing, virtual abdication of judicial 
review of legislation of this sort, leaving the outcome on such matters as this 
pretty much to legislative will.5 Similarly, the motorcycle dealers could 
expect to do no better by pursuing a claim based on an alleged denial of 
4. For an instructive description of the episode, see Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr 
Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (coordinated industry campaign to discredit motor freight carriers to 
induce public opinion to bring about restrictive congressional legislation of motor carriers exempt from 
the reach of federal anti-trust laws, the Court holding that, even assuming the campaign was a "con-
spiracy" in "restraint of trade," insofar as the means of seeking such a restraint was to bring it about 
through legislation, the First Amendment protected the right of the railroads to seek measures conced-
edly within the power of Congress to adopt). 
5. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728 (1963) (commenting on such legislation 
insofar as it is impugned on due process grounds, and rejecting such a complaint, declaring: "(l]t is up 
to the legislatures, not the courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of [such]legislation"); Olsen v. 
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) (Douglas, J., for a unanimous Court) ("We are not concerned ... 
with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation"); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
304 U.S. 144 (1938) (same position by the Court in respect to similar acts of Congress when chal-
lenged under Fifth Amendment due process clause); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) 
("With the wisdom of the policy, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, 
the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal"). For a still classic and useful critical review 
of this standard, see Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhu-
mation and Reburial, 1962 Sur. CT. REv. 34. For an extended and compelling argument that the 
Court's virtual abdication of due process review of legislation stifling product competition is wholly 
unwarranted by any mere repudiation of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), see Frank R. 
Strong, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS·· A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE ( 1986). 
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equal protection. For just as in respect to an attempt to bring a due process 
challenge, the current review standard for ordinary economic equal 
protection rights is an enfeebled inquiry of "imaginable rationality" and 
little, if anything, more. If there is some imaginable basis that would make 
the difference in treatment reasonable, the statute must be sustained, so the 
Court has declared, even if the legislature did riot act on that basis (but, 
rather, acted little better than as mere rent seekers, virtually selling their 
votes to those offering the greater political support).6 
Even absent total legislative success of this kind (i.e., total success in 
having motorcycles banned as simply "too dangerous at any speed"), the 
automobile dealers and the influential public interest groups allied with them 
would press other measures suitably designed to the same end, so to reduce 
the sales and uses of motorcycles, and so to divert consumer purchases to a 
different choice (cars, bicycles, or public transportation) deemed to be 
"better" and "safer" by the legislature of the state. Among the proposed 
measures were these: a state law severely limiting the number and location 
of authorized cycle dealers; a new measure levying a heavy thirty percent 
sales surtax on motorcycles; an additional measure requiring completion of 
an "approved motorcycle training program," for licensing eligibility for a 
motorcycle driving permit/ and fourth, increasing the minimum age for 
licensed owners to twenty-one. Here, too, they had no doubt that whatever 
of these approaches (or several others) the Virginia General Assembly might 
adopt "to reduce effective demand"8 for this "dangerous" product, the 
G. For the most recent reiteration of this (non)standard, see FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 
U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (Thomas, J., for a unanimous Court) (emphasis added) ("This standard of 
review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. •• • On rational-basis review ... those attacking the ration-
ality of the legislative classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might 
support it."') See also William Cohen & Jonathan Varat, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 690, 691 (lOth ed. 
1997) ("Despite occasional dissenting expressions of discomfort with the 'toothlessness' of rational 
basis review as applied in the realm of purely economic regulation ... , the Court consistently has 
refused to invalidate any such measure, with one notable exception, for more than fifty years") (and 
noting, that the one exception was itself subsequently overruled). (The exception was Morey v. Doud, 
354 U.S. 457 (1957). It was overruled in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)). (For a critical 
review of this toothless standard, see Gerald Gunther, [A} Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REv. I, 8 (1972) (nonetheless also noting, that the prevailing standard is "minimal scrutiny 
in theory and virtually none in fact.")) 
7. Under this part of the proposed plan, moreover, it was agreed that the state itself would not 
provide such programs. leaving it entirely to the dealers, or to someone else, to make their own provi-
sion for any such programs, wholly at their own expense. To qualify, it was agreed, such programs 
would need to have "state certification and approval," a process itself involving substantial fees. 
8. Cf 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) ("(W]e can ... agree with 
the State's contention that it is reasonable to assume that demand ... is somewhat lower whenever a 
higher, noncompetitive price level prevails."); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of 
Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 339, 341 (1986) ("The interest at stake in this case, as determined by the Supe-
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motorcycle dealers and anyone else who might side with them would readily 
fail in any effort to have them set aside on some conjured constitutional 
ground. Once again, that is, they were reliably assured that nothing in any 
of three principal clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment would stand in the 
way.9 
As it happened, however, despite their best efforts to secure the 
necessary votes on their preferred first choice, nothing approaching a 
majority of members in the Virginia General Assembly were ready to vote 
simply to outlaw motorcycles, either outright, or even as merely unlawful to 
use on public roads. For the moment, moreover, neither was there a 
sufficient consensus to pass any of the other proposals, although, to be sure 
it appeared very likely that several of them, perhaps even all of them, would 
command an easy majority in the legislature if a strongly preferred first 
option a member of the legislature suggested were to prove ineffective in 
diminishing motorcyc~e sales and use to "tolerable"10 levels, a matter to be 
determined after seeing how well this preferred first option tended to 
produce the desired effect during a trial period of five years. 11 
The "preferred first option" suggested by a member of the Virginia 
legislature was simply to enact a statute forbidding motorcycle dealers to 
advertise. 12 The intended effect would be twice beneficial, conducive to the 
rior Court, is the reduction of demand .... ") (So, here, a "reduction in demand" is sought quite di-
rectly, e.g., in the measure imposing the thirty percent sales surtax, putting the price of the product out 
of reach for buyers at the margin of affordability. In Posadas and in 44 Liquormart, the "reduction in 
demand" is sought somewhat more indirectly, by prohibiting advertising (thus to diminish public 
awareness of product availability, price, features, comparison with other products, etc., imposing 
increased search costs on potential consumers, and relying also on a simple psychological truth ("out 
of sight, out of mind"). See also Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 
U.S. 557 (1980) (same technique). 
9. As to the futility of seeking relief from any of these measures on a due process or equal protec-
tion complaint, see supra notes 4, 5. That a complaint seeking relief on the strength of the privileges 
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would likewise fail, see, e.g., The Slaughter 
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (state regulation of lawful ways of making a living, in this 
instance conferring an exclusive monopoly on a named company, putting several hundred competitors 
out of business pursuant to bribery of state legislators to do so, held, wholly unaffected by privileges 
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). (For a detailed, critical review, see Charles 
Fairrnan, VI HISTORY Of THE SUPREME COURT: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART ONE, 
pp. 1320-74 (1971). 
10. That is, whatever that "tolerable level" might be deemed to be (for this, again, would merely be 
a matter presumably within the discretion of the legislature to decide, consistent with its own view of 
how "the public interest" is best served). 
11· See also Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346 (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("It would surely be a pyrrhic victory for . 
. . appellant to gain recognition of a First Amendment right to advertise ... only to force the legislature 
into [more substantial measures]."). 
12· "Advertise," meaning "advertising in any manner whatsoever" (as in 44 Liquormart, the ban 
would be total, all media, all audiences, all times). Cf Posadas (casino advertisements directed to 
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prosperity of car dealers who individually (by dealership) and collectively 
(by common trade association ads touting cars) would continue to promote 
the merits of their products (even as the major auto manufacturers would 
doubtless continue to do), even while the statute would at once strike off any 
individual motorcycle dealer ads, or any institutional (motorcycle trade 
association) ads13 or manufacturer advertising of motorcycles. The act 
would at once remove these commercial voices altogether and ought, 
predictably, lead to much·lower motorcycle sales. 
The legislative proposal also aimed at Jeffries' kind of "Motorcycle 
News" feature, moreover, to exactly the same end. Thus it took care to 
forbid "any 'advertising' of retail motorcycle dealers, their business 
locations, services, or prices, whether provided for consideration, or 
provided gratuitously", (the italicized language was meant to cover Jeffries' 
"Motorcycle News" feature and other things of a like sort).14 This final part 
of the proposed bill was set off in a separate section, and accompanied by an 
express severability clause. 15 
Shortly following enactment of the described statute, 16 however, a civil 
suit challenging the announced intention of the Virginia Attorney General to 
enforce it, was filed in federal district court in nearby Richmond. The 
tourists exempted, but otherwise forbidden by any media or means); Cenlra/ Hudson ("informational," 
but not "promotional," regulated utility advertising permitted); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 
476 (1995) (ban of alcohol content information from being provided on beer bottle labels, but not 
otherwise). 
13. Trade association advertisements of a commercial product or service offered by the associa-
tion's members are of course "commercial speech" (that they may not mention particular brands or 
dealers in no respect makes them "noncommercial" speech). See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60,66 at n. 13 (1983). 
14. The wording ("gratuitously") was selected in order to exempt from the statute's coverage any-
thing reasonably within any bona fide news coverage (dms Jeffries' feature might be reached insofar as 
it appeared regularly, but "gratuitously," because generated by no news events). For a suitable anal-
ogy, encouraging the legislature to believe such a measure might be sustained, see Briscoe v. Reader's 
Digest Ass'n, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Ca. 1971) (invasion of privacy claim against Reader's Digest for story 
identifYing plaintiff as having been convicted of highjacking eleven years earlier, no recent event 
involving plaintiff making this report newsworthy, defendant could be held liable despite New York 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). See also state statute reviewed in Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697,702 (1931) (newspaper publication of defamatory statements deemed privileged only if both 
truthful and "published with good motives and for justifiable ends"). 
15. The reason for this treatment was obvious, as all agreed: the legislature (as well as the automo-
bile dealers and their "public interest" allies) was not at all certain that this provision could be sus- . 
tained under the First Amendment, as applied to the Jeffries' sort of feature (that is, provided by him in 
his own newspaper as owner-publisher of a standard newspaper). It might be seen as an impermissible 
form of editorial censorship violating "the freedom of the press." See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) ("The choice of material to go into a newspaper ... constitutes the 
exercise of editorial control and judgment"). Assuming it might not be sustained, however, the sever-
ability clause would still operate; it would leave the balance of the act unimpaired. 
16. Indeed, on the same day it was to take effect. 
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plaintiffs included several named individuals, each identified as a resident 
over eighteen years of age, each possessing a valid Virginia motor vehicle 
operator's permit, and eligible to own and to operate a motorcycle in 
Virginia. Each sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to forbid 
enforcement of the new statute by the state. 
In filing this action, these first-listed, citizen consumer plaintiffs (none 
of whom was a motorcycle dealer and none of whom had any direct 
economic stake derived from how well or how poorly motorcycle sales may 
fare) 17 proceeded exactly as other Virginia residents had done in seeking 
injunctive relief from an earlier advertising ban, a ban on drug price 
advertising in Virginia, just twenty years before.18 These plaintiffs appeared 
not on behalf of, or in substitution of, any motorcycle dealer, manufacturer, 
or trade association, rather, they appeared on their own behalf, as 
"individuals adversely affected by the state law, denied information 
respecting the availability of a lawful product, foreclosed by state law from 
receiving it in a useful form and from an otherwise responsible, willing and 
able source."19 
Other plaintiffs of course included several named retail motorcycle 
17. That is, none was alleged even to own stock in a motorcycle manufacturing company, much 
less a particular dealership. 
18. See Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (suit by 
consumer group to enjoin ban on pharmacist prescription drug price advertising, held, in their favor in 
the Supreme Court, both as to their standing to sue, and on the merit of their First Amendment claim 
(though the state law in no respect limited their own freedom of speech). Though no pharmacist had 
joined in this suit, it was enough, in the Court's view, that the plaintiffs alleged that there were pharma-
cists who would provide such advertising were it not forbidden by the state.) (The significance of the 
Court's holding regarding standing in Virginia Pharmacy is usefully explored in William E. Lee, The 
Supreme Court And The Right to Receive Expression, 1987 SUP. CT. REv. 303.) For a different exam-
ple, see Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (though no school librarian subject to school 
board directive claimed standing to object, and no affected publisher or author whose book was af-
fected by school board directive joined as plaintiffs, adversely affected plaintiff public school students 
held to have First Amendment standing, not as "speakers" (no speech of theirs at issue in any way) but 
solely as affected readers, to seek injunctive relief against a school board order that certain books be 
removed from the school library. The Court expressly noted that "we have held in a variety of contexts 
'the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."' /d. at 867 (emphasis added) 
(quoting from Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969), and citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972). See also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (postal ad-
dressee has First Amendment standing to object to government restriction on third party material that 
would otherwise have come to him but which material the government had detained.) (Lamont is the 
first case establishing a "right to receive information from a willing source," as sufficient to provide 
standing to complain of a restriction imposed on the source); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 
(M.D.N.C. 1968) (students of state university have First Amendment standing to assert right of free-
dom to receive information willing speakers would have provided on campus but were forbidden to 
provide because of state law forbidding them to speak on campus). 
19. See cases and discussions, supra. note 18. 
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dealers, now forbidden by Virginia law from providing any off premises 
business notice of their locations, hours, inventory, services, or any other 
information of a like sort, suing to lift the ban. Attached to their complaint 
was an example of such a forbidden advertisement. The Attorney General 
has straightforwardly advised a dealer it could not be used, whether, as 
previously, for publication in the Charlottesville Observer or in any direct 
mailing to local residents, or in another medium in the state; so as to call 
attention to the dealership as such. This is the "business notice" (i.e., the 
advertisement) in its entirety, as previously carried in the Observer, and now 
disallowed pursuant to the new Virginia act: 
Charlottesville Honda is a full service, authorized dealer of Honda 
motorcycles. We are located at 2134 Alta Vista Rd., in Charlottes-
ville, just off Exit 34 Jefferson Boulevard. Our business hours are 
9:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. weekdays and Saturdays from I 0:00 a.m. to 
5 p.m. Our inventory includes all current Honda street cycles 
from 250 cc (average 60 mpg in fuel economy) to 1500 cc touring 
cycles, including the new 1997 450 cc Silver Arrow (recently re-
viewed in Cycle Magazine as "overall best in its class"). Char-
lottesville Honda also carries a full line of Honda, U.S.D.O.T. 
safety-approved helmets, protective gloves, and all-weather 
clothing. All inquiries are welcome. Charlottesville Honda will 
sell only to purchasers who present a current license confirming 
their age and certifying their competence lawfully to operate a cy-
cle in Virginia. Charlottesville Honda has been in business in 
Charlottesville for thirty years. 
The Virginia Motorcycle Dealers Association (" V.M.D.A.") likewise 
appeared as a named plaintiff, suing on its own behalf0 and on behalf of its 
members. Of course, Thomas Jeffries is also a plaintiff, as owner and 
publisher of the Charlottesville Observer, restricted as he is, as a newspaper 
publisher, by the new Virginia law. 
Lastly, three other individual residents are also named plaintiffs in this 
case. Like the first named individual plaintiffs, each asserts a claim of right 
to uncensored infonnation "as it would otherwise be forthcoming to them 
but for the ban imposed by the new state law." And each asserts a claim as a 
person who resides in Charlottesville, who seeks uncensored information 
respecting certain lawful goods and services available in Charlottesville, 
20. The V.M.D.A.'s standing to sue in its own right is uncontested, given that its organizational 
purpose is the promotion of motorcycle information and use, and also that it occasionally sponsors 
generic advertising of motorcycles as well as of motorcycling, as both a regular and recreational alter-
native to other means of commuting, travel, and sport. 
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"the better to form an informed opinion in respect to their worth relative to 
other (i.e., alternative) services and goods." These plaintiffs also assert 
standing of their own. They seek to attack the ban "as a constitutionally 
prohibited attempt to influence public and private choice by disallowing the 
free circulation of truthful information the state does not wish them to have 
equal access to see lest they compare it with information they receive from 
others and reach conclusions different from those the state prefers them to 
entertain. "21 
All of the plaintiffs' causes of action have been filed pursuant to 42 
U.S.C.S. section 1983,22 and federal court jurisdiction has been plainly 
stated pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. sections 1331 and 1343(a)(3).23 The plaintiffs 
have named the Virginia Attorney General as defendant. It is conceded that 
all have standing to proceed in this way and that the Attorney General is a 
21. In short, they say, the purpose of the law is obviously partly one of "thought control" and not 
merely "marketplace control" (the phrase, "thought control," is taken from a part of the court's opinion 
in American Booksellers v. Hudnut, cited infra this footnote). The power of the state in respect to the 
latter (marketplace control, i.e., what can be bought and sold, by whom, on what terms, etc.), these and 
the other plaintiffs say, is not in dispute. The power of the state in respect to the former (thought 
control), these plaintiffs say, assuredly is. Car dealers and motorcycle dealers (among others) in con-
templation of the law at hand, are speech rivals, fully as much as railway carriers and motor freight 
carriers have been in the past and continue to be even now. The state, wishing the views solely pro-
moted by the car dealers to prevail, has muffled one side in order to assure that the other side will have 
a clear field. The object is not to assure success by setting terms of trade, rather, the object is to assure 
success by biasing what the public may see, so to bias what the public shall know. Car dealers (and car 
manufacturers, car trade associations, etc.) may freely advertise, inclusive of ad copy offering positive 
"facts" regarding why their products are desirable and negative "facts" regarding why motorcycles are 
undesirable, while motorcycle dealers (and motorcycle manufacturers, motorcycle trade associations, 
etc.) are forbidden to use merely the same medium even to dispute their claims, or to offer counter-
vailing observations or information, or offer any response, i.e., to "answer". See Rosenberger v. Rector 
and Visitors ofthe University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 392 (1992) ("[The state] has no ... authority to license one side of a debate to fight free-style, 
while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules."); American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 
771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985), summarily a.ff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) ("The state may not ordain 
preferred viewpoints in this way."); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1943) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) ("The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a 
guardianship of the public mind .... "). 
22. 42 u.s.c.s. § 1983 (1998). 
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects ... any . 
. . person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... , shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
23. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1331 (1998). 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized 
by law to be commenced by any person: ... [t]o redress the deprivation, under 
color of any State law ... of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Con-
stitution .... " 28 U.S.C.S. § 1343(A)(3) (1998). 
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proper party, to have to answer to the complaint. The case is admitted to be 
timely, serious, and ripe. So, what shall be its disposition (and what would 
Posadas fairly suggest)? 
I. THE POSADAS QUESTION 
The "Posadas question"24 (as we shall call it) seems to be the real 
question, for the Virginia statute is not designed, nor is there any pretense 
that it is tailored, merely to forbid, forestall or to provide redress for the 
circulation of commercially deceptive, or false or misleading information, 
such as such information might happen to be.25 The Attorney General 
concedes that this is so but merely demurs and points out that, under the 
Virginia law, "the accuracy or 'truth' of such information as an 
advertisement respecting motorcycles may contain will not save it, truth is 
irrelevant so far as this statute is concerned. "26 Its object is not to assure that 
only truthful information is supplied, rather, in large measure, its object is to 
see that such information is not provided, insofar as within the power of the 
state so to do?7 
Neither is the statute concerned (or "tailored") merely to avoid coercive 
or stressful forms of high pressure marketing practices or tactics. It is 
subject to no such saving rationale. This, too, the Attorney General also 
admits. Its object· is not to blunt or forestall varieties of commercial 
"overreaching," for in no respect is it reasonably limited to conditions 
presenting such a risk?8 
Nor is it of a common piece of a more general measure, regulating 
24 See the framing of that question, supra, note I. 
25. See,e.g., the sample advertisement submitted by Charlottesville Honda. There is nothing false 
or misleading in any of its statements or representations, nor does the Attorney General claim other-
wise. (Cj Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (advertisement placed by 
attorney promising that "[i]f there is no recovery, [there will be] no legal fees", while literally true, 
may nonetheless mislead by omitting mention of court costs, thus state may require such additional 
information to be provided but not otherwise ban such advertisements). 
26. Indeed, from the state's point of view, "truth" is the greater part of the problem (that is, it is the 
accuracy, rather than any inaccuracy, of representations of product availability, price, features, fuel 
economy, colors, options, zero-to-sixty acceleration rates, or top running speeds, etc., of diff~rent 
makes and models (of motorcycles), the state seeks to suppress from concern of how just such infor-
mation may influence those to whose attention it may come). 
27. See discussion supra note 26. 
28. Cj, e.g, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (state bar restriction on "bed-
side" personal injury solicitation of clients by lawyers, sustained). See also Florida Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc., 5 I 5 U.S. 618(1995) (extending Ohra/ik to sustain a state law restriction forbidding direct mail 
professional inquiries within thirty days of personal injury). (But see Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 
(1993) (invalidating state law torbidding uninvited in-person solicitations by certified public account-
ants)). 
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commercial speech as even a broad, community-wide restriction on 
billboards might represent.29 Neither is it an enactment meant merely to 
provide some fair sanctuary in one's home or place of business from 
intrusive marketing practices, such as they might otherwise be, were it the 
case (as it is not the case)30 that the law could provide no common relief 
from the incessant "calls of commerce" wherever one might turn. 
Nor, again, is it merely akin to still older kinds of "time, place, and 
manner" municipal ordinances of a sort forbidding commercial handbill 
hawkers from adding to the general congestion of the public streets.31 
Rather, serving no similar end or ends, this statute bans the mere placement 
of plaintiffs' sample advertising copy in an ordinary newspaper of general 
circulation, as it bans it equally, even as a simple mailed brochure. 
Accordingly, and as the Virginia Attorney General concedes, it has no 
qualified, or limited, commercial speech "time, place, or manner" 
rationale.32 
29. See, e.g., Song of the Open Road (0. Nash, I WOULDN'T HAVE MISSED IT: SELECTED POEMS 
OF OGDEN NASH 31 (1975) (usefully quoted in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 164 Cal. Rptr. 
510, 532 (1980)): 
I think I shall never see 
A billboard lovely as a tree. 
Indeed, unless the billboards fall, 
I'll never see a tree at all. 
See also Walter Lippmann, DRIFT AND MASTERY 52-53 (1914) (describing modern advertising as a 
"deceptive clamor that disfigures the scenery, covers fences, plasters the city, and blinks and winks at 
you through the night"). 
30. See, e.g., Moser v.FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, SIS U.S. 1161 (1995) (sus-
taining congressional ban on mass telemarketing use of "automatic-dialing-and-announcing-devices" 
(devices programming prerecorded commercial messages, automatically dialing and playing when one 
answers one's telephone, with no live operator on the line); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 491 U.S. 469 
(1989) (university restriction on salesmen soliciting in university dormitories, sustained); Breard v. 
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (sustaining a local ordinance disallowing uninvited door-to-door 
commercial solicitations, Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting as applied to magazine sales solicitations, 
though agreeing that the ordinance would survive as a time and place restriction on soliciting sales for 
"pots and pans" or other products not covered by the first amendment). Cf Martin v. City of Struth-
ers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
31. See, e.g., Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (sustaining ordinance ban on ordinary 
commercial handbill distribution on public streets). Cf Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
Because commercial speech is indeed "hardy", it may well be that restriCtions limiting certain forums 
to noncommercial speech are sustainable, when indeed ample outlets (and the commercial incentive to 
use them) remain fully available for the usual advertisement of ordinary lawful goods and services. 
See Virginia State Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, n. 24 (1976). Indeed, it 
is arguable that the Court may have erred in not adequately acknowledging the extent to which this 
may be so. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) and compare 
William Van Alstyne, Some Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1635 
(1996). 
32. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (emphasis added) ("[T]he gov-
ernment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, pro-
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Is it the case that the statute is nevertheless not objectionable on First 
Amendment grounds? If so, on what reasoning might one presume so to 
declare? Wherein does the explanatiof) lie? 
II. DOES THE GREATER POWER INCLUDE THE LESSER? 
Is it because, as suggested by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Posadas, 
"[T]he greater power to completely ban [an activity or product] necessarily 
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of [such an activity or 
product]"33 without otherwise presuming to interfere with it so far as the 
legislature is currently disinclined to do? That is, is this the answer to the 
"elegant question" as framed by Justice Stevens,34 because as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist went on to elaborate in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. 
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 35 "[I]t is precisely because the government 
could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it 
is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing 
the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising." 36 
That this is so, though there may be nothing in the content of such 
advertising (and also nothing in the manner of its presentation, its format, its 
. means of distribution, or the age or competence of those to whom it may 
generally directed, etc.) distinguishing it in any respect from advertisements 
others are free to use in respect to such goods or services it is lawful for 
them to provide? But why should that be so? 
The straightforward idea here (and in the preceding quotation from 
Posadas) might be thought to be so obvious, as hardly to be worth spelling 
out, indeed, simply this: that no one is forced to get into the casino trade (or, 
here, into the business of marketing motorcycles), and insofar as one 
understands that the legislature closely regulates this particular 
(prohibitable) trade in a certain way (including, as here, by providing that no 
advertising thereof is permitted by or on behalf of one who engages in that 
trade), one may conclude that, in light ofthe restriction, it is not worthwhile, 
vided the restrictions ·are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they 
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of information.'"). (quoting Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 ( 1984)). 
33. Cf Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,345-46 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, C.J.) ("In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily 
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling ... .''). In the instant case, plaintiffs 
concede the legislature could forbid motorcycles to be sold, so, on its face. the point, though made with 
reference merely to "casinos," seems equally applicable here. 
34. See supra note I. 
35. 478 U.S. at 347. 
36. /d. (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). 
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that is, that one would be better off pursuing some other line of business 
(namely, one not subject to this particular restraint). And so one is perfectly 
free to do. What one may not do, however, is to suppose that one may take 
up the business of the casino trade, and then simply disregard one of the 
clearest restrictions of all: namely, that while engaged in this trade, one will 
abstain from all advertising related thereto. Given that this is a business the 
legislature could forbid outright, if one nevertheless wants to pursue what 
one thinks may well be a lucrative business notwithstanding the restrictions, 
one is welcome to do so. But when, as here, it is a business the legislature 
could altogether forbid, to quote Justice Rehnquist (from still a different 
case)37, "a litigant in the position of the appellee must take the bitter with the 
sweet."38 
If this is the explanation, such as it is (and there seems little reason to 
think that it is not), the position taken by Justice Rehnquist in Posadas 
seems to be constructed from an analysis not much different from that 
advanced by Justice Holmes' many decades earlier, in the quite famous case 
of McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,39 dismissing a policeman's complaint 
on observations of a strikingly similar sort neither more nor less.40 The 
policeman had been discharged for violating a rule of which he was well 
aware when he became a policeman (in this instance, a rule disallowing 
public statements reflecting on the police). "The petitioner," Holmes 
observed in McAuliffe, "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but 
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."41 If one wants nonetheless 
to be a policeman, he may, Holmes observed, but in doing so, of course "he 
takes the employment on the terms which are offered him," neither more nor 
less.42 And having done so, Hol~es declared, "he cannot complain."43 Thus 
the suggestion, pursued by Justice Rehnquist in Arnett (and equivalently in 
Posadas?), that "a litigant in the position of the appellee must take the bitter 
with the sweet." Or so it might be thought, if there were no more to be said. 
Yet, in the particular case in which Justice Rehnquist first offered this 
view, the Supreme Court had disagreed with Justice Rehnquist's analysis, 
such as it was, declined to follow it at all.44 Rather, in Arnett (and later also, 
37 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). 
38. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
39. 29N.E.517(Mass.l897). 
40. See /d. at 518. 
41. /d. 
42. /d. 
43. ld. 
44. See /d. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 
518 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:3 
in Loudermill), the Court held that it is the state (not the employee) that may 
sometimes accept "the bitter with the sweet". Specifically, in Arnett, that the 
state must accept something it may not want (providing tenured employees 
with pretennination procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, rather than some lesser, legislatively-preferred procedure), in 
order to get something it desires to have (presumably the better quality of 
service it may receive by providing some kind of job tenure for its 
employees rather than by compelling all to serve solely for fixed tenns or to 
be terminable simply at will). The point was plainly put by Justice Powell, 
in the following way, in Arnett: "While the legislature may elect not to 
confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally 
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without 
appropriate procedural safeguards."45 
In fact, quite early on, and long prior to cases such as Arnett, the 
Supreme Court had heavily qualified the "greater-and-lesser" (or "right-
privilege") syllogism, in respect to the First Amendment as well. It had 
done so via the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions. "46 Indeed, had the 
Court not done so, the power of the government effectively to crush 
constitutional rights under the powers of the "right-privilege" (and "greater-
and-lesser") doctrines would have left very little not within government 
reach to command pretty much as it might wish, even as the Court 
u.s. 532 (1985). 
45. Arnell, 416 U.S. at 167 (emphasis added). So, here, too, one might suggest, the legislature may 
be free not to permit any lawful trade of a certain sort, but nonetheless conclude that "such an interest, 
once conferred, while conferred, and within the boundaries it has been conferred, brings with it com-
mensurate rights of free speech" (that is, merely the same rights at one's own expense to furnish public 
information respecting that trade, even as others are free to do in respect to such trade as is likewise 
lawful for them). 
46. "[T]he doctrine of unconstitutional conditions limits the goverment's ability to make someone 
surrender constitutional rights ... to obtain an advantage that could otherwise be withheld." Clifton v. 
Federal Elections Commission, 114 F.3d 1309, 1315 (1st Cir. 1997) (construing an act of Congress as 
not forbidding the spending-for-speech at issue in the case, and so construing the act in order to avoid 
the likelihood that the act would otherwise be vulnerable as invalid for imposing an unconstitutional 
condition). See generally, William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (1968); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989); Brooks Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Pow-
ers: A Separability Approach, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 371, 458-62 (1995) (with additional references at 
p. 373, n. I). See also Philip Kurland, Posadas De Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas Strange, 
'Twas Passing Strqnge; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 SUP. CT. REV. I, 13 (noting 
specifically how the argument offered by Justice Rehnquist in Posadas "bears a great similarity to that 
long since rejected under the rubric of unconstitutional conditions"). Indeed, it does. For being 
obliged to forbear from any advertising whatever (merely of the same utterly conventional sort all 
others are free to provide), as a condition of being allowed to compete at all, is arguably a condition of 
just this, "unconstitutional" kind. 
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acknowledged in the course of its own critical review.47 
To face up to the issue more directly, however, and this time without 
recourse to mere legal epigrams (whether of the "greater-lesser" sort on the 
one hand, or of the "unconstitutional conditions" sort on the other hand), in 
returning still again to Posadas, perhaps one may more correctly say this, 
with appropriate detachment: "If it is true that the power to forbid an 
activity implies a power to forbid any advertisement of such an activity, and 
to do so even when the activity has not been forbidden Gust as Justice 
Rehnquist s!lggests in Posadas), it is true only because the Supreme Court is 
so inclined to read the Constitution so to provide. Otherwise it is not true." 
Putting the point this way, moreover, merely helps clear the air. 
So, the question remains to be answered: why should the Supreme 
Court read the Constitution so to provid~,' when nothing in the Constitution 
suggests that this is necessarily a correct reading or understanding of its 
various provisions that may bear on the question? Certainly nothing in its 
text compels such a reading. Nor is it simply some sort of obvious 
Euclidean self-evident truth. Indeed, perhaps it would be at least equally 
plausible to read the Constitution quite differently, for example, to say the 
following, instead: 
Whether or not a legislature may forbid an activity (a question it 
will be time enough to consider if and when the legislature pre-
sumes to do so), when it has not done so (i.e., when it has not ex-
ercised that power, such as it may be), there is no reason to sup-
pose its power to restrict or forbid speech providing information 
pertinent to that activity is at all the same as though it had exer-
cised that power. Indeed, it is surprising that anyone should think 
that it is, for there is no equivalency in the circumstances at all. 
Perhaps it, the legislature, may altogether forbid the activity in 
question; and perhaps, also, a legislature may do so for virtually 
47. See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583, 594 
(1926) ("If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it 
may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the 
Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence."). Arnell, 416 U.S. 134 
(1974). See also United States ex rei. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1920) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting), (describing the mail as something that could be abolished whenever the gov-
ernment might choose to do so, but which, in the meantime, so long as the government chooses to 
maintain it (that is, so long as the government finds it useful to provide a postal system), it must be 
prepared to accept some of the "bitter" (certain mail it would strongly preter not to carry because of its 
content) as long as it wants whatever advantage it finds in the "sweet" (the mail it does desire to carry 
for such value as it may be thought to have)). Holmes' position in Burleson thus reflects a considerable 
change in his thinking since his dismissive opinion in the McAuliffe case. (And, indeed, the McAuliffe 
syllogism itself was abandoned in subsequent decisions by the Court. See, e.g. Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).) 
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any reason satisfactory to itself (i.e., that this is so if just because 
the Constitution may scarcely place any restraint on its power to 
do so, insofar as we have concluded, for better or for worse, that 
when it does so, such decisions as it shall make, when of this sort, 
are hardly subject to judicial review at all). But, however that may 
be, when it has not exercised that power in respect to a particular 
activity, and insofar as the activity is permitted, the First Amend-
ment applies to prohibit the legislature from presuming to forbid 
those lawfully engaged in it to provide public information in re-
spect to that activity, so to furnish at their own expense a fair de-
scription of what it is (i.e., what the 'activity' consists of, to whom 
it is lawfully available, when, and on what terms), always answer-
able for the truth of their representations, such as those represen-
tations may be, neither more nor less than others who likewise of-
fer other lawful goods or services may likewise be made to do. 
For so much as this, we think, the First Amendment secures of its 
own force. Nor do we readily understand what would so mislead a 
legislature to suppose otherwise, that the First Amendment, de-
spite the manner in which it is written, somehow implies it is 
largely just up to legislative bodies to decide the extent to which 
people shall be permitted to learn or not of services and products 
lawfully available to them. We know of no such doctrine permit-
ting legislative bodies thus to try to control what people may learn 
or from whom they may learn it. And we find no basis to accept it 
merely because requested so to do. 48 
This view of the matter merely acknowledges how the First Amendment 
may operate as a independent restraint on Congress and on the states.49 
48. Indeed, why isn't this as logical or even a more logical "reading" of the Constitution 
than that suggested by Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Posadas, so to say something 
quite different about the Constitution, merely of the following sort? 
49. The proposition is also much more of a piece with what the Court elsewhere reports 
as its own view, for example, in Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993), 
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a 
forum where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, 
some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the 
government, assess the value of the information presented. 
Id 
This position is also merely the same as the Court has taken, equivalently, in respect to due 
process in cases such as Loudermill and Amett. And for fuller elaboration, see also Brooks 
Fundenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev 458-62, 76-78 (reviewing Posadas and usefully diagramming greater-and-
lesser powers); Martin Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 589 (1966). 
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But may we say instead that any restriction on advertising, whether by 
motorcycle dealers or others whose commercial activity the state could 
altogether shut down, while not necessarily exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny, need meet only the minimal requirements of ordinary economic 
substantive due process review (rather than First Amendment standards as 
such)?50 Judged by that "mere rationality" standard (i.e., the "(non)standard" 
of minimal scrutiny, bordering on virtual nonjusticiability)51 ; the standard 
applicable, however, where no one's speech as such is the object of any 
restrictive law, the Virginia statute clearly meets the appropriate test?52 
50. See, in strong. accord with this suggestion, Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin 
Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. 
L. REV. 1 (1979) (noted and cited by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340, n. 
7). 
51. See supra notes 4, 5 and 9. 
52. Indeed, but this is merely a virtual reiteration of the "greater-and-lesser" proposition 
explicit in Justice Rehnquist's Posadas position, rather than a different approach (even as 
his reference to the Jackson-Jeffries' article, supra n. 45, further suggests). It once again 
elides any distinction between presuming to regulate the product and presuming to sup-
press accurate commercial information about the regulated product, treating them as 
equally within the discretion of the legislature to dispose of as it may please itself to do. For 
with no significant difference in rephrasing, what the Chief Justice necessarily suggested 
(in the "greater-and-lesser intrusion" view of the law involved in Posadas), was that (consti-
tutionally speaking) whatever reasons, no matter how utterly uncompelling or even petty, 
would be deemed constitutionally adequate by the Court insofar as the government enacted 
a "wholesale prohibition" on a given kind of commerce, the very same reasons must perforce 
also be constitutionally adequate when the government takes "the less intrusive" step of 
tolerating the trade and merely forbids any advertising by those permitted to engage in it. 
This is so "precisely because" the government could have taken the more restrictive step of 
outlawing the trade (the greater, the power to ban the trade, includes the Jesser, the power 
to ban advertising of such trade as the government permits in any line of trade the govern-
ment could ban). 
Again, however, as we have seen, since there is almost no line of commerce government 
cannot prohibit, even merely for the purpose of favoring those in competing goods and 
services (see, discussion supra notes 3, 4 and 7), this would leave only a thin (and highly 
uncertain) category of goods and services not subject to nearly uncabined legislative power 
to declare "who may advertise and who may not," and giving the First Amendment no sepa-
rate work to do. Indeed, to escape the rationale, such few goods as government could not 
reach on this basis (namely, such privately offered commercial goods or commercial services 
of a kind government could not ban), would have to find some special "anchor" in the Con-
stitution itself and thus, in finding some substantively protected "marketing entitlement" 
secured against government in the Constitution, not be goods or services of a kind the gov-
ernment could ban (e.g., possibly "commerce" in certain printed matter, such as newspapers 
as implicit in "the freedom of the press"); or "commerce" in at least some kinds of legal 
services (as implicitly protected in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and in 
one part of the Sixth Amendment the part that refers to the "right to counsel"); or possibly 
some even "commerce" in condoms or other contraceptive items and abortion services (as 
necessary to certain constitutionally-anchored "privacy" rights pursuant to Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). All of this, incidentally, Philip Kurland presciently recognized in the 
critique he offered of Posadas more than a decade ago. See supra note 41. See also Martin 
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Or is it because while this may not be true either3 (rather, what is true is 
that the "advertising restrictions" at issue here are obviously specific, 
content-directed prohibitions of truthful statements of lawful consumer 
information in contemplation of utterly lawful transactions and, as such, are 
speech restrictions unexceptionally subject to conventional First 
Amendment review), the restrictions nevertheless can fairly be said to 
"directly advance the government's substantial interest in the health, safety, 
and welfare of its citizens," and that in doing so, they "are no more extensive 
than necessary to serve the government's interest," and thus meet the Court's 
own First Amendment, Central Hudson "commercial speech" test, 54 just as a 
Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the 
Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 V AND. L. REV. 1433, 1440-41 (1990). 
53 See discussion supra, note 52. 
54. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (emphasis added) 
I d. 
In commercial speech cases ... a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, 
we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. 
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it ... must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted government in-
terest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and 
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." If the re-
striction meets these requirements, it is to be upheld. 
So, here, specifically in respect to our motorcycle advertising ban, applying the specific 
word formula of Central Hudson, may it be said that the state has a "substantial" interest 
in the good health of its citizens, and likewise, therefore, a "substantial interest" also in 
reducing the number of hazardous, unshielded, crash-prone, powered motorcycles in private 
use and at large on the public roads? (Why not? For surely it may be so "said," just as the 
Virginia legislature, alert to the test, can be expected to take due care so to declare.) As to 
whether this measure is "no more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest," is 
there any obvious ground for saying'that it is "more extensive" than is "necessary" to serve 
that interest? If so, in what way, and who are the courts so to declare? If the legislature 
declares that it is merely as extensive as it needs to be to do its task efficiently, on what 
basis could a corLrt presume to say otherwise, e.g., to declare that "something more com-
promising," or "something permitting at least some advertising" would be enough?" Enough 
for what? Surely a total ban on motorcycle advertising would have much greater effect than 
some half-way measure, would it not? 
So, thus applying the "test," if,. indeed, this, the Central Hudson formula, is to supply the 
formula, though it is (superficially) quite different from, and more demanding than, the 
mere economic substantive due process "test," what does it come to, in the end? That even 
the larger part, if not the whole part, of the legislative purpose was in fact to secure the 
greater prosperity of the automobile dealers, rather than any particular "public safety" 
concern, may well be true. Still, if securing their greater prosperity (either per se or be-
cause it is felt, by the legislature, that their products are more in the public interest than 
the products of competitors) is not likely to be regarded as a "substantial" interest, then the 
legislature is simply unlikely so to admit the point, indeed, least of all will it be inclined to 
do so, given its awareness of the requirements of the Central Hudson test. Rather, one may 
expect it will say nothing about wanting to protect automobile dealers and will cite a con-
cern for "public safety," so to meet the "substantial" interest part of the Central Hudson 
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majority of the Court likewise also found in Posadas,55 in keeping with what 
has since been quite rightly described as an alternative basis for the holding 
in that case?56 
Or is it the case, rather, that this ought to fail as well, 51 so that whether 
or not motorcycles (or some other goods or services, whether margarine, 
muslin, or mopeds) could be outlawed, heavily taxed,58 or otherwise 
restricted, whether for private use or in commerce (for, indeed, there may be 
scarcely any meaningful constitutional restraint limiting either Congress or 
even the states in this regard), "the state may not suppress truthful speech in 
order to discourage its residents from engaging in a lawful activity,"59 
test. So much being shown, nothing remains, then, except possibly a quarrel as to whether 
the chosen mode of restriction--the ban on advertising in any form, "directly" "advances the 
governmental interest asserted." And who is to say that it does not satisfy that require-
ment as well? See David Anderson, Torts, Speech, and Contracts, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1499, 
1521 (1997) (reviewing all of the Court's commercial speech cases and usefully noting that 
"[N}o commercial speech restriction has been struck down on the grormds that it was indi-
rect. 'J 
55. "[T]he statute and regulations at issue in this case, as construed by the Superior 
Court, pass muster under each prong of the Central Hudson test. We therefore hold that 
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico properly rejected appellant's First Amendment claim." 
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344. The argument in this branch of Posadas does not rely on the 
"greater-and-lesser" reasoning , rather, it is independent, i.e., it stands on its own. It is 
much the same as that which might sustain a state-law based tort action for invasion of 
privacy in respect to a newspaper presuming to publish private facts of a private person, 
unassociated with any newsworthy event (e.g., the kind of case discussed at supra note 14). 
"The state," obviously, "has a substantial interest in protecting each person's 'right to be 
left alone,"' such a court might declare, in applying a Central Hudson standard of First 
Amendment review, to meet its first requirement. And "the restriction placed on the news-
paper," it might then proceed to say, is "no more extensive than necessary" to secure that 
particular right, which it does, and "directly" so. (Query, however, even accepting the ar-
gument here, whether the analogy fits: truthful information on the availability of a lawful 
product, one might note, prejudices no one's "rights," and wherein does the government 
presume to assert it has a substantial interest in keeping consumers uninformed in respect 
to the relative cost, relative advantages, availability, etc., of one kind of lawful product or 
lawful service vis-a-vis others they may in fact not prefer?) 
56. See Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 43 n. 190 (1995) 
(criticizing Posadas, and suggesting that subsequent cases "demoted" its greater-and-lesser 
reasoning" to the status of an altemative holding")( emphasis added). 
57. See discussion supra notes 52, 53 respecting the manner in which a literal Posadas-
style of applying Centml Hudson standards would appear to work out. 
58. See, e.g., McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 30 (1904) (ten cent per pound tax 
imposed on colored margarine, none on butter (whether artificially colored or not), sus-
tained on basis that colored margarine could be outlawed (thus, even assuming the tax 
"discriminated against oleomargarine in favor of butter, to the extent of destroying the 
oleomargarine industry for the benefit of the butter industry," as was alleged), it would not 
matter; the result was no different than might have been done directly, albeit ostensibly for 
"consumer protection" as the alleged purpose. 
59. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe Puerto Rico 
constitutionally may suppress truthful commercial information in order to discourage its 
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however else it may presume to regulate that activity, or determine the 
conditions or terms of its lawful pursuit (down to and including its outright 
prohibition), or otherwise restrict its own residents' access to that activity, so 
far as a legislature may decide so to do? In brief, that both Posadas and 
Central Hudson (to the extent Posadas relied on Central Hudson in its 
alternative holding) simply in error in suggesting the contrary? 
For, to offer the obvious first-level distinction once again, so far as the 
latter kind of power is concerned (i.e., so far as the power to determine what 
commercial services may or may not be permitted), to be sure, the First 
Amendment may indeed have very little to say, if just because the First 
Amendment (unlike the Fifth Amendment, such as it ist0 is·'not addressed to 
government power generally to determine what goods and services may or 
may not be lawfully provided or whether, if provided, to whom they may be 
provided, under what circumstances, or on what particular terms. But, (and 
need we be reminded still again?) the First Amendment does speak to 
restrictions on speech, the immediate, indeed the sole, target of the Virginia 
law put into challenge in this case.61 
And, at the next step, moreover, the First Amendment provides no 
general exception the Court would recognize as such just because the speech 
in question supplies information on particular lawful goods and services, 
whether motorcycles or milk, (or milk substitutes) rather than information 
about something else (e.g., information about today's weather, or 
information about tomorrow's election, or information about yesterday's 
smashup of cars on some local road).62 Nor (and here perhaps we reach a 
residents from engaging in lawful activity."). 
GO. See cases and discussion at supra note 5. See also Carolene Products Co. v. United 
States, 323 U.S. '18 (1944) (Carolene Products I[). Despite clear labeling sufficient to dispel 
any consumer confusion or possible product misidentification, and despite uncontested 
proffer of proof that lower cost, vitamin-fortified vegetable oil in defendant's product met 
all the nutritional standards of whole milk such that there was no basis to describe defen-
dant's product as either "adulterated" or as misbranded, an Act of Congress successfully 
lobbied by the dairy industry to totally forbid defendant's lower cost product was sustained. 
Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause would provide no ground for re-
lief.) For an effective critique of Carolene Products II, see Frank R. Strong, SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW--A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE 226-31 (1986). 
Gl. See Martin Redish, Tobacco Advertising and The First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
589, 599 (1996) C'[I]t is beyond dispute that the First Amendment provides greater protec-
tion to speech than the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clauses provides to the sale of a 
f:roduct.") 
2 See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 1510-12 (1966)(Stevens, J.,joined in 
this part of the Opinion (Part VI), by Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.)(" The reasoning in Posadas 
does support the State's argument, but, on reflection, we are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously 
performed the First Amendment analysis. ••• Because the 5-to-4 decision in Posadas marked such a 
sharp break from our prior precedent ... we decline to give force to its highly delerential 
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critical juncture in this essentially tendentious essay) does the First 
Amendment provide an exception that the Court should be willing to 
recognize, permitting the suppression of such information, to keep it from 
reaching the public, just on account of its commercially interested source.63 
That accurate information respecting the availability of a lawful product 
or service is forthcoming principally, or even solely, by the exertions of one 
from whom it may be purchased (and who on that account may expect to 
recover the cost of providing the information from lawful transactions in the 
particular product or service), does not suggest why it should be any more 
subject to suppression on that account, under the First Amendment, than 
were it provided instead in the most ordinary reportage of a general 
newspaper, or in an ordinary subscription copy, or public library copy, of 
Consumer Reports (where we can be quite sure it would be fully protected 
by the First Amendment). That the speech in question the government here 
seeks to suppress appears in a flyer distributed by a motorcycle shop, rather 
than in an identical flyer distributed to all the same persons by an individual 
or an association who differ solely in that they may personally have Jess 
economically at stake in doing so, would appear to provide very little by 
way of distinction between them, moreover, in respect to the proper measure 
of protection each may be due, so far as the First Amendment is 
concerned.64 
To press the point, not inappropriately, merely consider variations on 
the unprepossessing case immediately at hand, even as modeled on Posadas 
itself. A legislature may not regard it as a contribution to the public welfare 
that a newspaper would run a regular local feature on casinos the state sees 
fit to license (though it need license none), and yet have no power to 
suppress that feature, chock full of unexceptionably accurate casino 
information as it may be, dislike it for such reasons as they may. Nor will it 
approach.* .. We also cannot accept the State's second contention, which is premised entirely on the 
'greater-includes-the-lesser' reasoning endorsed toward the end of the majority's opinion in Posadas. 
[T]he First Amendment directs that government may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress 
conduct, and that speech restrictions canot be treated as simply another means that the government 
may use to achieve its ends. ***Moreover, the scope of any 'vice' exception to the protection afforded 
by the First Amendment would be difticult, if not impossible, to define.") 
63. Of course, one can invent (or "read in") such an ultimate exception, if one is so in-
clined, but assuredly the burden is appropriately placed on those so inclined to do and the 
question at once presents itself as to why one would wish to follow that particular idea (and 
also, perhaps at least as importantly, what makes one thinks the First Amendment adopts 
that idea). 
64. See First Nat'! Bank v. Be Iotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) C'The inherent worth of the 
speech in terms of its capacity to inform ... does not depend up·on the identity of its source . 
. . . "). See also Posadas, 478 U.S. at 354-55; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
466 U.S. 485 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. GO, 66 (1983). 
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matter whether the feature is carried partly, or even principally, or even 
wholly, because the newspaper thinks it conducive to the newspaper's own 
commercial success so to provide that feature, rather than for some reason 
· more sublime.65 
So, too, the legislature may see no value, but only a public disservice, to 
a news story bringing to public attention the datum that the state's official 
lottery (which state lottery, moreover, the state allows itself to advertise, as 
indeed most state lotteries do )66 offers a payout much inferior by far to any 
of the commercial casinos in the state.67 That the "public interest" might 
well be deemed by the legislature to be disserved by the publication of that 
datum of information may be true.68 But it is also quite beside the point. 
For though it may be true, one may with full confidence predict that the 
legislature may not on that account seek69 to prevent a newspaper from 
publishing just such information insofar as it is true. Nor may it seek to 
subject the newspaper to some penalty (e.g., some fine) for what it has 
presumed to do.70 
65. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
384 (1973) (emphasis added) 
If a newspaper's profit motive were determinative, all aspects of its operations--from the 
selection of news stories to the choice of editorial position--would be subject to regulation if 
it could be established that they were conducted with a view toward increased sales. Such 
a basis for regulation clearly would be incompatible with the First Amendment. See also 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 
498, 514 (1959) C'The profit motive should make no difference, for that is an element inher-
ent in the very conception of a press under our system of free enterprise."). 
66. See Robyn Gearey, The Numbers Game, 216 THE NEW REPUBLIC 19, May 19, 1997). 
67. Cf. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 353-54 (noting how the Puerto Rico ban on casino advertis-
ing at issue likewise did not apply to advertising by the state lottery, and further suggest-
ing that "it is surely not far-fetched to suppose that the legislature chose to restrict casino 
advertising not because of the 'evils' of casino gambling, but because it preferred that 
Puerto Ricans spend their gambling dollars on the Puerto Rico lottery."). 
68. For, to be sure, it may at once result in a switch of consumer interest more toward 
casinos and away from the state lottery, the entire net proceeds of which, unlike the casino's 
proceeds are earmarked for public schools (the adequate financial support of which, from 
state lottery net proceeds, is ofcourse of "compelling" legislative concern). 
69 Or, rather, may not successfully seck, for who knows what the legislature may try to do. 
70. To be sure, the legislature, one may readily concede, could prohibit casinos from 
offering any gaming odds more favorable than those offered by the state lottery, or heavily 
tax their proceeds, restrict their ownership, or indeed simply "remove them from the field." 
Yet, though all this is true, it could have no hope, consistent with the First Amendment, in 
any effort to forbid newspapers, or mere radio talk show hosts (or anyone else, for that 
matter), from informing the public of such differences as there may still be (whatever they 
still are as between the casinos, such as they are, and the state lottery, such as it is). But see 
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the famous "Pentagon Papers" 
case. In respect to the newspaper, in brief, nothing in the nature of the mere Central Hud-
son test would be used. 
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Nor is it obvious on what basis it should feel entitled to hope for any 
better result just because it "merely" forbids any casino (though not "any 
newspaper") to publish those differences such as they are or, indeed, to 
forbid it to publish any information whatever respecting its location, lawful 
services, and its ordinary business hours, such as they may be.71 For it 
would, now to quote Justice Rehnquist against himself,72 be "a strange 
constitutional doctrine" (a strange First Amendment doctrine) which would 
hold that it is up to the newspapers (governed by such interests as may 
varyingly motivate their publishers)73 to determine what information (if any) 
is to be available, on the range of goods and services lawful for citizens to 
consider for themselves. Nor, indeed, is there anything offered in either 
Posadas or in Central Hudson to suggest that this is somehow the manner in 
which the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, that "Congress 
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech," is meant to work. 
To be sure, as we now turn toward some closure on this essay, insofar 
as a commercial enterprise offers a lawful service which, however, it also 
71. See, First Nat'! Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) C'The inherent worth of the 
speech in terms of its capacity to inform ... does not depend upon the identity of its 
source."); Fudenberg, supra note 41 at 458-62, 476-78. 
72. Cf Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346 
It would ... be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the leg-
islature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature 
the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity 
through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased de-
mand. 
73. Consider merely the description of the case at hand regarding the "motives" of Tho-
mas Jeffries as publisher: one part "altruistic" and public-spirited (i.e., he believes that 
more motorcycles and fewer cars will, all things considered, provide a better community 
than the one that was troubling him, with its ever-crowding, pre-existing "pro-automobile" 
trend), but also one part "businessman" (i.e., he believes adding this feature will add (or . 
help retain) readers and paying subscribers (which in turn helps attract advertisers) and so 
add profit or at least help avoid loss; and perhaps one part "free speech altruist" (i.e., sub-
ject to only certain minimum standards, he believes it to be part of a newspaper's function 
to provide information readers find of meaningful interest, whether it would necessarily be 
of similar interest to him). But the case would not differ, however, if the newspaper pub-
lisher were utterly a "pure profit-maximizer" (even as some so regard the international 
publishing magnate, Rupert Murdoch, and others still would identify, for example, Larry 
Flynt). 
So, too, in respect to those simply selling motorcycles or other lawful goods, no doubt the 
range of motives is both wide and equally mixed (i.e., there is no reason to assume that they 
see no benefits, or positive social value to their products, much less that they attach no 
positive informational value to what they put in their advertisements (but seek merely to 
euchre the credulous, i.e., "merely to make money" by "stimulating" a wholly "artificial" 
demand). "Altruism" (in the larger sense of the word) need not be some missing component 
from varieties of business, nor, oppositely, is the motive of pure "profiteering" unknown 
within the weedy fields of the fourth estate (i.e., "the press"). Cf C. Edwin Baker, Commer-
cial Speech: A Problem in The Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976); Randall 
Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 781-816 (19D5). 
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does no more than to describe to others in no less truthful terms (but 
merely the same terms), and by no more intrusive means (but merely the 
same means) as other lawful enterprises are equally free to do in respect to 
such goods or services as may likewise be lawful for them to provide, and 
to do so, moreover, at its own expense74 , it is no doubt quite true that 
neither we or any legislature can have some sought-after assurance that 
people will make "good" choices ("good choices," of course, as we, or as 
some legislature, regard such "good" choices to be). While it, the activity, 
remains lawful7S, however, and within the boundaries that it is lawful, 
however, perhaps it is a fairer reading of the First Amendment to suggest 
that that is a matter ultimately left for them to determine, according to their 
own lights, and not for the legislature to presume to do by deflecting, 
suppressing, or· outlawing information that would otherwise reach them 
from a competent and willing source. For the First Amendment, may not 
require the government to support any kind of commerce/6 or for that 
matter, even to support any particular kind of speech, but it firmly sets its 
countenance against regimes of government censorship to deny, or steer 
or deflect information out of public view lest those to whose attention it 
might otherwise come might presume to find something in it the 
government would prefer they not so freely be allowed to know. So, at 
least, one may believe the First Amendment is better understood, indeed, 
so much as this in keeping with but the most ordinary understanding of 
freedom of speech, rather than anything peculiar, arcane or strained.77 
74 Merely in the same manner as any other producer or retailer may likewise do 
75 A matter the First Amendment does not presume to decide and, indeed, a matter with respect to 
which the Constitution as a whole may have only a little to say, leaving decisions of this sort largely to 
political determination such as it may be. · 
76. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
77. See also Vincent Blasi, Milton's Areopagitica and the Modem First Amendment, 
YALE LAW SCHOOL OCCASIONAL PAPERS, Second Series, No. 1 (1995). Indeed, the Canadian 
Supreme Court has accepted this view of the matter, as well, in some reasonably strong 
degree, despite the considerably weaker protection generally provided in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights for freedom of speech in Canada than our First Amendment provides, and 
even in respect to commercial products of no notable distinction as such. See RJR. 
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) [1995] 127 D.L.R. 4th 1 (aff'g judgment 
declaring void large portions of the Tobacco Products Control Act of 1988, forbidding com-
mercial advertisements of tobacco products in Canada). The Canadian Tobacco Products 
Control Act of 1988 prohibited advertising of tobacco products in Canada (excepting only 
advertisements of foreign tobacco products appearing in imported publications). The Act 
also required unattributed health warnings on all tobacco products and forbade manufac-
turers from putting any other material on tobacco packages, prohibited the marketing of 
derivative products displaying the trade marks of tobacco companies (exempting principally 
only use of such trade marks in identifying financial benefactors of various public interest 
programs, e.g., acknowledgments of sponsorship of "a cultural or sporting activity or 
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Moreover, even as others have suggested, including several from within 
the Court itself, neither Posadas or Central Hudson (so far as Central 
Hudson figured as an alternative ground in Posadas) yields any convincing 
reason for some other conclusion for one to reach.78 
event"), and forbade any free, or rebate or gift-tied distribution of tobacco products. With 
three judges dissenting, however, the Canadian Supreme Court sustained plaintiffs' re-
quest for a declaratory judgment that the restrictions violated section 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights (the Charter section generally protecting freedom of speech and of the 
press) and were not saved by section 1 (the "savings" section permitting such infringements 
as are "reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"). Accord-
ingly, in keeping with the Court's Opinion, the section imposing the advertising ban (in-
cluding mere informational advertising) of tobacco products was declared unconstitutional 
under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter. And separately, the requirement mandating 
unattributed health warnings was also held invalid under section 2(b), as was likewise the 
prohibition of the use of trade marks on any other articles (i.e., articles other than tobacco 
products). Much of the balance of the act was declared invalid (but largely because of non-
severability). The provision forbidding free distributions, and some few other regulations 
were upheld. ld. at pp. 74-88 (McLachlin, J.). 
It may be additionally noteworthy that the Canadian Court reached its decision in this, 
a purely "commercial speech" case, despite its earlier decisions sustaining quite sweeping 
bans on "hate" speech and "discriminatory" speech (such as they are deemed to be in Can-
ada) in Regina v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 697, and Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 
neither of which forms of restriction on speech have survived court tests here. See American 
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), summarily aff'd., 475 U.S. 1001 
(1986); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
78. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
[I]ntermediate scrutiny [i.e., Central Hudson scrutiny] is appropriate for a restraint 
on commercial speech designed to protect consumers from misleading or coercive 
speech, or a regulation related to the time, place, or manner of commercial speech. 
I do not agree, however, that the Court's four-part test is the proper one to be ap-
plied when a State seeks to suppress information about a product in order to ma-
nipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot or has not regulated or 
outlawed directly; 
See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 523 (1996) (Thomas, J .. concur-
ring) 
I do not join the principal opinion's application of the Central Hudson balancing 
test because I do not believe that such a test should be applied to a restriction of 
·commercial' speech, at least when ... the asserted interest is one that is to be 
achieved through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark; 
Id. See also Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 318. 
349 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe [a state] constitutionally may sup-
press truthful commercial information in order to discourage its residents from engaging 
in [a] lawful activity."); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) ("[A]ny description of commercial speech that is intended to identify the 
category of speech entitled to less First Amendment protection should relate to the rea-
sons for permitting broader regulation: namely, commercial speech's potential to mis-
lead."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (Douglas, J.) ("[T]he State may 
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of avail-
able knowledge."); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1943)(,Tackson, J., concur-
ring)C'The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from 
assuming a guardianship of the public mind .... "). 
